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Three Wrong Progressive Approaches (and One
Right One) to Campaign Finance Reform
Richard L. Hasen*
I. INTRODUCTION
Times are tough for progressives who support campaign finance reform. The Supreme Court has taken key steps towards deregulating campaign finance through a series of cases, most importantly Citizens United v.
Federal Election Commission.1 Since Citizens United, outside spending in
federal elections has increased markedly—as much as 245% in presidential
elections, 662% in House elections, and 1338% in Senate elections2—raising
dangers of corruption and increasing political inequality. The Supreme
Court could well move further toward deregulation this Term, as it considers
the constitutionality of aggregate limits on campaign contributions.3 While
Citizens United leaves ample constitutional space for the enactment of effective disclosure laws, disclosure is a poor substitute for more serious and
effective campaign regulation including limits on outside spending and ample public funding.4
Even worse, Congress has not fixed holes in our second-best disclosure
laws, which clever campaign finance lawyers continue to exploit. These defects not only increase the danger of corruption but also deprive the public of
information important to making intelligent voting decisions. The prospects
for legislative responses in the near term are bleak, when Democrats cannot
even get Republicans to sign on to disclosure fixes.5 The Federal Election
Commission has become mired in ideological struggle, with three Republican commissioners marching lockstep to disable what remains of campaign
finance enforcement.6 Although he campaigned as a reformer, President
Obama has done nothing significant to help the cause of reasonable cam-

* Chancellor’s Professor of Law and Political Science, University of California, Irvine
School of Law. Thanks to Bruce Cain, Anthony Johnstone, Tom Mann, Norm Ornstein, and
Mark Schmitt for useful comments and suggestions.
1
See Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010); FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 551
U.S. 449 (2007).
2
DANIEL H. LOWENSTEIN, RICHARD L. HASEN, & DANIEL P. TOKAJI, ELECTION LAW:
CASES AND MATERIALS 44–45 (5th ed. Supp. 2013).
3
See McCutcheon v. FEC, No. 12-536 (U.S. argued Oct. 8, 2013).
4
See Richard Briffault, Updating Disclosure for the New Era of Independent Spending,
27 J.L. & POL. 683, 715–19 (2012).
5
See Eliza Newlin Carney, DISCLOSE Advocates Renew Fight, ROLL CALL (Jan. 4, 2013,
11:50 AM), http://atr.rollcall.com/disclose-advocates-renew-fight.
6
See Christopher Rowland, Deadlock by Design Hobbles Election Agency; The FEC Was
Born of Idealism After Nixon Era Excesses, but Its GOP Members Have All But Shut It Down,
BOS. GLOBE, July 7, 2013, at A1.
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paign regulation. In fact, his own new 501(c)(4), Organizing for Action,
will help to further expand the influence of money in politics.7
The current reality is far from the progressive ideal of campaign finance
regulation for the twenty-first century. Such an ideal begins with strong
protections for robust political debate, a free press, and multi-dimensional
partisan competition. Progressives should recognize that campaign finance
laws that would squelch political competition are unhealthy for the political
system and normatively undesirable. The ideal progressive reform requires
creative design to maximize diverse voices in the political community: for
example, voucher-based public financing fosters the voice and power of all
voters. Finally, core campaign finance regulation remains necessary, including a strong disclosure regime, which deters corruption and provides valuable information to voters, and sensible limits on contributions and spending,
which inhibit political corruption and promote political equality.
What are progressives to do to move from the bleak reality closer to
this ideal? In this short essay, I argue against three misguided approaches to
reform: seek to amend the U.S. Constitution to overrule Citizens United; pay
lip service to the cause of reform but take no concrete steps against the worst
problems with the system; and throw in the towel, giving up the fight to
limit money in politics. Each of these approaches likely will make things
worse rather than promote the progressive ideal. Instead, I argue that
progressives should seek to preserve and protect what remains of campaign
finance law today, especially contribution limitations, public financing, and
disclosure laws, and progressive thinkers and lawyers should lay the intellectual groundwork for effective campaign reform proposals and constitutional
arguments to be presented to a future, more progressive Supreme Court
majority.
II. BAD IDEA I: SEEK

TO

AMEND

THE

CONSTITUTION

One of the immediate responses to the Supreme Court’s controversial
Citizens United decision has been a call to amend the Constitution to “reverse” Citizens United. For example, Senator John Tester (D-Mont.) and
Senator Chris Murphy (D-Conn.) recently proposed a constitutional amendment (Tester-Murphy) that would remove any constitutional protections for
corporations and allow for “reasonable” state and federal regulation of corporations.8 Consider also this proposed amendment supported by Move to
7
See, e.g., Justin Elliott, Obama’s Flip-Flops on Money in Politics: A Brief History, PRO
PUBLICA (Jan. 30, 2013, 3:00 PM), http://www.propublica.org/article/obamas-flip-flops-onmoney-in-politics-a-brief-history; Eliza Newlin Carney, Rules of the Game: Obama’s Ethics
Agenda Backfires, ROLL CALL (Jan. 20, 2013, 10:30 AM), http://www.rollcall.com/news/
rules_of_the_game_obamas_ethics_agenda_backfires-220898-1.html.
8
S.J. Res. 18, 113th Cong. (2013); see also Lachlan Markay, Constitutional Amendment
Would Gut Rights for Organizations, WASH. FREE BEACON (Jun. 19, 2013, 1:10 PM), http://
freebeacon.com/constitutional-amendment-would-gut-rights-for-organizations.
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Amend, one of the most prominent organizations working to reverse Citizens
United:
Section 1. [Artificial Entities Such as Corporations Do Not
Have Constitutional Rights]
The rights protected by the Constitution of the United States are
the rights of natural persons only.
Artificial entities established by the laws of any State, the United
States, or any foreign state shall have no rights under this Constitution and are subject to regulation by the People, through Federal,
State, or local law.
The privileges of artificial entities shall be determined by the People, through Federal, State, or local law, and shall not be construed
to be inherent or inalienable.
Section 2. [Money is Not Free Speech]
Federal, State, and local government shall regulate, limit, or prohibit contributions and expenditures, including a candidate’s own
contributions and expenditures, to ensure that all citizens, regardless of their economic status, have access to the political process,
and that no person gains, as a result of their money, substantially
more access or ability to influence in any way the election of any
candidate for public office or any ballot measure.
Federal, State, and local government shall require that any permissible contributions and expenditures be publicly disclosed.
The judiciary shall not construe the spending of money to influence elections to be speech under the First Amendment.9
It may well be that these proposed amendments are not serious policy
recommendations, but rather are political theater aimed at riling up the Democratic and progressive base. I address this “lip service” possibility in Part
II of this Essay. In the remainder of this Part, however, I take the amendment proposals at face value and evaluate them against progressive ideals,
because I have heard from many members of the public who are dissatisfied
with Citizens United and have clamored for a constitutional amendment. I
conclude that a constitutional amendment such as Tester-Murphy or Move to
Amend is a bad idea for many reasons, but to understand why, we need to
back up to consider the state of campaign finance law before Citizens
United.
First Amendment jurisprudence surrounding campaign finance law is
complicated, too complicated to completely describe in this brief Essay.10
But at the risk of caricature, here is where things stood before the emergence
9
H.R.J. Res. 29, 113th Cong. (2013); see also Move to Amend’s Proposed 28th Amendment to the Constitution, MOVE TO AMEND, https://movetoamend.org/wethepeopleamendment
(last visited Dec. 8, 2013).
10
For a full picture, see generally DANIEL HAYS LOWENSTEIN, RICHARD L. HASEN, &
DANIEL P. TOKAJI, ELECTION LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 641–882 (5th ed. 2012).
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of the Roberts Court and Justice Alito’s replacement of Justice O’Connor,
which turned campaign finance law around 180 degrees:11 limits on contributions to candidates and committees in candidate elections were constitutionally permissible on anti-corruption grounds,12 although very low
contribution limitations could raise constitutional questions.13 In contrast,
limitations on spending by individuals supporting or opposing candidates, or
by the candidates themselves, violated the First Amendment’s protections of
speech and association.14 The Court held that independent spending cannot
corrupt candidates because of the absence of coordination, and that political
equality was an impermissible governmental interest in light of the First
Amendment.15 Nonetheless, the Court later held that the government could
bar direct corporate and labor union spending (from their treasury funds) on
elections, likely so long as the corporation or union could form a separate
political committee and solicit donations from certain persons to the committee.16 The Court held that Michigan could justify its corporate limits to
prevent a “different” kind of corruption, one which looked very much like a
political equality rationale.17 Although corporate spending limits were constitutionally permissible, such limits need not (and perhaps constitutionally
could not) have been extended to media corporations engaged in producing
bona fide news stories and editorial content. News media, including corporate news media, serve important educational and democratizing functions.18
Further, the Court held that it was unconstitutional to bar direct corporate
spending of treasury funds by nonprofit corporations that were not conduits
or agents of for-profit corporations or labor unions.19
The pre-Alito regime was not entirely coherent, for example, in its
treatment of media corporations compared to other corporations—a point
that opponents of regulation pointed to as a reason to scuttle the whole sys-

11
On the change wrought by Justice Alito, see generally Richard L. Hasen, Citizens
United and the Illusion of Coherence, 109 MICH. L. REV. 581 (2011) [hereinafter Hasen,
Illusion of Coherence]; Richard L. Hasen, Beyond Incoherence: The Roberts Court’s Deregulatory Turn in FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, 92 MINN. L. REV. 1064 (2008).
12
See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 24–38 (1976).
13
See Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov’t. PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 389 (2000).
14
See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 38–59.
15
Id.
16
See McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 104–05 (2003); Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 655 (1990).
17
See Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 381 n.2 (2010) (Roberts, C.J., concurring)
(“ Austin represents the first and only case [before McConnell] in which a majority of the
Court accepted, in deed if not in word, the equality rationale as a permissible state interest.”)
(quoting RICHARD L. HASEN, THE SUPREME COURT AND ELECTION LAW, JUDGING EQUALITY
FROM Baker v. Carr to Bush v. Gore 114 (2003)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
18
See Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 417 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting the “unique role
played by the institutional press in sustaining public debate”); Austin, 494 U.S. at 668 (“A
valid distinction . . . exists between corporations that are part of the media industry and other
corporations that are not involved in the regular business of imparting news to the public.”);
see also McConnell, 540 U.S. at 208 (quoting Austin).
19
See FEC v. Mass. Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238, 241 (1986).
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tem.20 Looming questions about what counted as “the press” in the Internet
era complicated things.21 The pre-Alito regime also left room for large independent spending, although by individuals acting alone and not through political action committees (or “PACs”) thanks to a $5000 cap on contributions
to such committees.22 Such independent spending was relatively rare in federal elections. But the jumble of rules did, albeit inadvertently, strike a delicate balance between free speech rights and anti-corruption and political
equality interests.23 The state of campaign financing after the enactment of
the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (the McCain-Feingold law)
but before the Roberts Court was not the progressive ideal, but it was not a
nightmare either.
Citizens United reversed two Supreme Court holdings allowing the
government to limit the spending of corporate treasury funds on elections, a
ruling which no doubt applied to labor unions as well.24 Following Citizens
United, lower courts struck down the limits on individual contributions to
PACs used to fund independent spending.25 The Federal Election Commission thereafter held that corporations and unions could donate unlimited
sums to these PACs as well,26 leading to the creation of PACs that engaged
solely in independent spending, entities which came to be known as “Super

20
Former Judge and now-Professor Michael McConnell has defended Citizens United precisely on the basis that it is impossible to separate the institutional press from everyone else.
See Michael W. McConnell, In Defense of Citizens United, 123 YALE L.J. 412 (2013).
21
See Richard L. Hasen, Lessons from the Clash Between Campaign Finance Laws and
the Blogosphere, 11 NEXUS L.J. 23, 24–25 (2006).
22
The point is somewhat controversial. See Matt Bai, How Did Political Money Get This
Loud?, N.Y. TIMES, July 22, 2012, at MM14; Richard L. Hasen, The Numbers Don’t Lie: If
You Aren’t Sure Citizens United Led to the Emergence of Super PACs, Just Follow the Money,
SLATE (Mar. 9, 2012, 2:56 PM), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/politics/
2012/03/the_supreme_court_s_citizens_united_decision_has_led_to_an_explosion_of_campaign_spending_.html; Rick Hasen, What Matt Bai’s Missing in His Analysis of Whether Citizens United is Responsible for the Big Money Explosion, ELECTION LAW BLOG (Jul. 18, 2012,
10:41 AM), http://electionlawblog.org/?p=37108. Under the old regime, some individual
money went into 527 organizations, but the FEC fined some of these organizations after the
2004 elections for not registering as political committees (subject to the $5000 cap) and it is
not clear whether they would have played a significant role going forward.
23
See Bob Bauer, Progressive Reform and Progressive Politics, MORE SOFT MONEY
HARD LAW (July 16, 2013), http://www.moresoftmoneyhardlaw.com/2013/07/progressive-reform-and-progressive-politics. As Bob Bauer notes, I have been quite critical in the past of the
doctrinal incoherence of the pre-Alito regime. The result struck a relatively fair balance even
if it took a convoluted jurisprudential route to do so. But Bob is right that I might be guilty of
some unwarranted nostalgia for days gone by.
24
LOWENSTEIN, HASEN, & TOKAJI, supra note 10, at 756 (asking rhetorical question about
application to labor unions).
25
See, e.g., SpeechNow.org v. FEC, 599 F.3d 686, 698 (D.C. Cir. 2010), cert. denied sum
nom Keating v. FEC, 131 S. Ct. 553 (2010).
26
See FEC Adv. Op. 2010–09, FED. ELECTION COMM’N (July 22, 2010), http://saos.nictusa.
com/saos/searchao;jsessionid=2679A122DBE458093E3CE1E306EE6B82?SUBMIT=ao&A
O=3067; see also FEC Adv. Op. 2010–11, FED. ELECTION COMM’N (July 22, 2010), http://saos
.nictusa.com/saos/searchao;jsessionid=2679A122DBE458093E3CE1E306EE6B82?SUBMIT
=ao&AO=3069.
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PACs.”27 While Super PACs took unlimited donations, the PACs disclosed
the identity of donors to the Federal Election Commission. Some activity
then shifted to political groups that organized under section 501(c)(4) of the
Internal Revenue Code. These groups, which are defined as “social welfare
organizations” in the Internal Revenue Code, do not disclose their donors.28
Thanks to the IRS’s failure to police the line between social welfare groups
and election-related groups using the 501(c)(4) forms,29 outside spending exploded in the 2012 elections, as corporate and union spending limits disappeared along with contribution limits and source limitations to fund
independent spending.30
No doubt a constitutional amendment could be written simply to “reverse” Citizens United. Such an amendment could say that Congress has the
power (and perhaps state and local governments also have the power)
through appropriate legislation to ban corporations (and presumably labor
unions) from spending their treasury funds in candidate elections. However,
it is not clear that such an amendment would make much difference. Under
such an amendment, Sheldon Adelson or George Soros could still give millions of dollars, much of it anonymously, to groups seeking to influence
federal elections. Citizens United and the development of Super PACs seem
to have had a psychological effect in freeing individuals to give obscenely
large sums to these outside groups. Even with Super PACs outlawed, we
could expect the very rich to engage in direct independent spending.
Even putting aside huge individual spending, an amendment, depending
on how it is written, could allow for a great deal of corporate-funded “issue
advocacy” intended to influence the outcome of elections but falling outside
its coverage.31 It might be ineffective even in reining in corporate spending
in elections. On the flip side, it is not clear that language in a constitutional
amendment “reversing” Citizens United would adequately protect the incorporated press (such as the New York Times or FOX News) and nonprofit
ideological corporations, which the Supreme Court had protected before Citizens United. The concern is not about ads running in these media outlets;32
27
On the emergence of Super PACs, see LOWENSTEIN, HASEN, & TOKAJI, supra note 10, at
818–25.
28
See id. at 825, 919–20.
29
On the differences and similarities among Super PACs, 501(c)(4) organizations, and
other organizations, see Richard Briffault, Super PACs, 96 MINN. L. REV. 1644, 1646–50
(2012).
30
See Hasen, SLATE, supra note 22.
31
If the amendment is drafted more broadly, it runs the risk of interfering with genuine
issue advocacy by corporations mentioning the names of federal candidates.
32
Cf. Victor Tiffany, Taking on Amendment Critics XVIII: Richard Hasen, AMENDMENT
GAZETTE (Aug. 8, 2013), http://www.amendmentgazette.com/2013/08/08/taking-on-amendment-critics-part-xviii-richard-hasen (“Campaign regulations could with regulations proscribe Fox News Inc. from running campaign ads for the Republican candidate for president or
Congress on CBS, ABC, CNN or any other television channel. Likewise, MSNBC, Inc. would
not be free to run campaign ads for the Democratic candidate for president or Congress on
other channels. Paid staff members and consultants of these channels could, as individuals of
the press, appear on another channel to make their case for a candidate, but all corporate
spending on electioneering communication could be outlawed after the We the People Amend-
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instead the concern is whether the outlets themselves, if incorporated, could
continue to endorse candidates and give favorable or unfavorable treatment
to candidates before the election.
Given the proliferation of Super PACs and the use of 501(c)(4)s for
electioneering, and given other progressive concerns with the state of campaign finance law beyond problems with corporate spending, proposed
amendments such as Tester-Murphy and Move to Amend have proposed going much further than simply “reversing” Citizens United. Tester-Murphy
would take away all corporate rights—for all corporations (including, presumably, media corporations and nonprofit corporations) for all purposes.33
For example, the government might be able to take property from corporations without paying just compensation, which would otherwise violate the
Fifth Amendment. New York State might be able to prevent the publication
of the New York Times, which is a corporation; note that Tester-Murphy
guarantees freedom of the press only for “people,” and the amendment expressly excludes corporations from the definition of “people.”34
Move to Amend in one way goes even further than Tester-Murphy,
seeming to mandate limitations upon, or at least some regulation of, campaign spending. “Federal, State, and local government shall regulate, limit,
or prohibit contributions and expenditures, including a candidate’s own contributions and expenditures . . . .”35 A local government that failed to adequately “regulate” campaign spending could be sued for violating the
Constitution. Courts would have to decide what type and extent of regulation would be sufficient to meet the constitutional floor.
Conservatives have condemned the anti-speech aspects of these broad
proposed amendments,36 and progressives should join in the condemnation.
Citizens United might be bad for our democracy, but these approaches look
like a cure worse than the disease. Changing the Constitution is no small
feat, and it is a terrible idea to change it with broad language that could
squelch healthy political debate, limit press freedoms, and muzzle nonprofit
ment is ratified by the 38th state without any impact on the individual freedom of the press as
it has been traditionally understood.”).
33
S.J. Res. 18, 113th Cong. §§ 2–3 (2013).
34
Id. Cf. S.J. Res. 11, 113th Cong. (2013). Senator Bernie Sanders’s proposed amendment also protects “freedom of the press” but holds that only “natural persons” may make
“contributions and expenditures to influence the outcome of public elections.” It is not clear
how these two provisions are reconciled in the case of the corporate press.
35
H.R.J. Res. 29, 113th Cong. (2013) (emphasis added). See MOVE TO AMEND, supra
note 9.
36
See generally Eugene Volokh, Sens. Tester & Murphy’s Constitutional Amendment
Would Strip Rights From Corporate Owned Newspapers, Advocacy Groups, Etc., VOLOKH
CONSPIRACY (Jun. 19, 2013, 1:41 PM), http://www.volokh.com/2013/06/19/sens-testermurphys-constitutional-amendment-would-strip-rights-from-corporate-owned-newspapers-advocacy-groups-etc; JOHN SAMPLES, Move to Defend: The Case Against the Constitutional
Amendment Seeking to Overturn Citizens United, CATO INST. (2013), available at http://www.
cato.org/publications/policy-analysis/move-defend-case-against-constitutional-amendmentsseeking-overturn. But see Mark Schmitt, The Wrong Way to Fix Citizens United, NEW REPUBLIC (Jan. 20, 2012), http://www.newrepublic.com//article/politics/99833/constitutional-amendment-citizens-united (providing a rare progressive condemnation).

\\jciprod01\productn\H\HLP\8-1\HLP105.txt

28

unknown

Seq: 8

11-MAR-14

Harvard Law & Policy Review

16:45

[Vol. 8

ideological corporations (not to mention limit corporations in other ways
outside the campaign finance area that should make progressives squirm).
The problem goes beyond drafting to the larger issue of placing broad
power to control political speech in the hands of Congress and state and
local governments. A constitutional grant of broad, speech-limiting power
will be risky now, because it is hard to cabin, and riskier later, in light of
uncertainty over future generations’ political, religious, social, and moral beliefs and preferences. In contrast, the pre-Alito incremental constitutional
development of campaign finance jurisprudence through the Supreme Court
struck a broad compromise between those interests for and against campaign
finance regulations. That common law court-centric approach to campaign
regulation is more nimble than a blanket grant of power to Congress and
state and local governments in a constitutional amendment to do whatever
they wish with campaign finance law or corporate rights.
Given the hydraulic nature of campaign regulation, in which campaigns, parties, individuals, and groups adapt their strategies and organizational forms in an effort to circumvent regulatory frameworks, the task of
enshrining durable rules into a single constitutional provision seems unlikely. Certainly none of the many attempts at drafting constitutional
amendments that I have seen come close to dealing with loopholes, unintended consequences, and an appropriate balance between speech and robust
debate concerns on the one hand, and anticorruption and political equality
concerns on the other.
In short, drafters will either write a narrow constitutional amendment
“reversing” Citizens United, which would not address many of the evils
within our current campaign finance regime, or a very broad amendment,
which would raise speech-squelching dangers and the potential for unintended consequences across a variety of social and political issues.
III. BAD IDEA II: PAY LIP SERVICE

TO THE

CAUSE

OF

REFORM

There is good reason to believe that many of these proposed constitutional amendments to “reverse” Citizens United, especially those coming
from elected Democratic officials, are political theater and not serious attempts to deal with problems of campaign finance regulation. Groups like
Move to Amend, in contrast, seem well-intentioned but poorly conceived.
These proposed amendments are part of a broader Democratic strategy, most
notoriously pursued by President Obama, to talk broadly against the Supreme Court and Republican refusal to enact regulations while failing to take
concrete steps toward fixing campaign finance problems.
The constitutional amendment route is not a serious policy proposal.
Democrats cannot even get Republicans in the Senate to agree on legislation
to fix the holes in federal disclosure law, which became glaringly obvious in
the 2012 elections. Consider how much harder it would be to pass a mea-
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sure taking away all corporate rights or mandating that every jurisdiction in
the country enact at least some campaign finance regulations.
A constitutional amendment would require not just a supermajority in
the Senate (where Senator McConnell would lay his body down to block it),
but also a supermajority in the Republican House and in three-quarters of the
states. With polarization in Congress, amendments to overturn Citizens
United are going nowhere.37 Unfortunately, campaign finance has devolved,
especially since Citizens United, into a partisan issue, and it is simply impossible to believe that Republican state legislatures would even consider an
amendment such as Tester-Murphy or Move to Amend.
But bashing Citizens United, the Republican-appointed Supreme Court,
and Republicans in Congress is good business for Democrats and helps with
fundraising. President Obama has been the Basher-in-Chief, controversially
going after the Supreme Court’s Citizens United decision in a State of the
Union address in the presence of Supreme Court Justices. When the President falsely claimed that the decision allows foreign corporations to spend
money in elections (an issue the Court specifically reserved in Citizens
United and later—and inconsistently—decided against foreign campaign
spenders38), cameras showed Justice Alito shaking his head and saying “not
true.”39
President Obama may otherwise be a progressive President (I leave that
judgment to others), but his record on campaign finance reform has been all
talk and no action.40 The President was the first general election candidate to
refuse to participate in the presidential public funding program,41 a program
that is now dead in part thanks to his decision. He promised a plan to fix the
program and never offered one. He promised a program to fix the Federal
Election Commission and never offered one. He has been slow to nominate
FEC commissioners. He has never presented legislative alternatives to mitigate the effects of Citizens United and he has never led on congressional
efforts to improve campaign finance disclosure.
In the meantime, hiding behind the rhetoric opposing Citizens United,
he has taken advantage of increasing deregulation. Aside from opting out of
the public funding program and aggressively using joint fundraising committees with Democratic Party organs, he has transformed his campaign organization, “Obama for America,” into “Organizing for Action” (OFA), a
501(c)(4). OFA has increased the number of avenues for large donors to
37
See Richard L. Hasen, End of the Dialogue? Political Polarization, the Supreme Court,
and Congress, 86 S. CALIF. L. REV. 205, 211 (2013).
38
See Bluman v. FEC, 132 S. Ct. 1087 (2012) (mem.), aff’g 800 F. Supp. 2d 281 (D.D.C.
2011); LOWENSTEIN, HASEN, & TOKAJI, supra note 10, at 756–57.
39
See Louis Jacobson, Why Alito Shook His Head: Obama Exaggerates Impact of Supreme Court Ruling on Foreign Companies, POLITIFACT (Jan. 27, 2010), http://www.politifact.
com/truth-o-meter/statements/2010/jan/27/barack-obama/obama-says-supreme-court-ruling-allows-foreign-com (rating President Obama’s statement “mostly false”).
40
See Elliott, supra note 7; Carney, supra note 7.
41
See LOWENSTEIN, HASEN, & TOKAJI, supra note 10, at 845–49.
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seek to curry favor with the President and the executive branch.42 Once
again, President Obama has blazed a fundraising trail that has done great
damage to the cause of campaign finance reform.
Even with a Republican Congress blocking much legislation, and a Supreme Court that has limited the options on the table, there is much that the
President could have done. He could have led more publicly on disclosure,
as some Republicans seemed interested in a deal to fix disclosure problems
in exchange for raising some of the campaign contribution limits (which
looks like a good deal given the alternative of less accountable money). He
could have tried to recess-appoint reformers to the FEC and propose legislation to fix the FEC43 and put pressure on Republicans in Congress to do
something. He could have required more disclosure through executive orders. He could have at least used his bully pulpit to present a progressive
vision of what campaign finance reform in the Citizens United era should
look like.
A cynic might say that the President rails so loudly against Citizens
United so that he can inoculate himself against criticism for the unprecedented campaign finance steps he has taken. It should be no surprise that
Obama advisor David Axelrod recently tweeted in favor of unlimited campaign contributions to candidates.44 The President can proclaim a desire to
fix the system, while making the reasonable point that rather than unilaterally disarm Democrats must fight political battles under the rules as they
exist at the time. But he has done more than fight under existing rules; his
actions have helped accelerate the pace of deregulation. His lip service has
been worse than silence.
IV. BAD IDEA III: THROW

IN THE

TOWEL

Arguments for constitutional amendments to “reverse” Citizens United
are not serious, and much of what comes out of Democrats’ mouths on campaign finance these days is lip service or worse. But there is a more serious

42
Frank James, Watchdogs Not Celebrating Obama Group’s Switch on Big Donors, NPR
(Mar. 7, 2013, 6:08 PM), http://www.npr.org/blogs/itsallpolitics/2013/03/07/173748542/
watchdogs-not-celebrating-obama-groups-switch-on-big-donors.
43
On the problems with the FEC, see Richard L. Hasen, The FEC Is as Good as Dead,
SLATE (Jan. 25, 2011, 10:13 AM), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2011/01/the_fec_is_as_good_as_dead.html.
44
David Axelrod, TWITTER (Feb. 20, 2013, 7:57 AM), https://twitter.com/davidaxelrod/
status/304258408058601472 (“Campaign finance system is a mess. Limits have just created a
cottage industry for lawyers who devise schemes to circumvent them. 1/3”); David Axelrod,
TWITTER (Feb. 20, 2013, 7:57 AM), https://twitter.com/davidaxelrod/status/304258430296
813568 (“Too much money in politics. But if it’s inevitable, let it flow directly to candidates
and demand full disclosure, with stiff penalties. 2/3”); David Axelrod, TWITTER (Feb. 20,
2013, 7:57 AM), https://twitter.com/davidaxelrod/status/304258450307833856 (“And end the
SuperPac and faux SuperPac game that too often allows donors to elude detection and candidates to deny responsibility. 3/3.”).
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argument from progressives Ezra Klein45 and Jonathan Bernstein46 that the
time has come to at least partially throw in the towel on campaign finance
reform and move on to other issues. After all, in the first presidential election cycle since Citizens United, a Democrat was re-elected President and
Democrats kept control of the Senate. So far there have been no great revelations of scandal calling into account the integrity of our governmental system stemming from the sloshing around of so much campaign money
(although I still expect them to come).
While both lip service and throwing in the towel are defeatist strategies,
they differ in important ways. “Lip service” avoids honest discussion about
the costs and benefits of campaign regulation and the impediments to reform. It can only lead to disappointment on the part of progressive reformers. “Throwing in the towel” seeks to engage in honest dialogue on those
costs and benefits and to reorient progressive politics in a different direction.
While there is not much good that can be said about “lip service,” progressives should listen and seriously consider the “throwing in the towel”
argument.
Klein has not fully called for throwing in the towel. He wrote that
pundits and campaign reformers overrate money as determinative in the outcome of races.47 He argued that plans to harness the power of small donors
are likely to increase political polarization, as small donors tend to be ideological donors whose views will push Democrats to the left and Republicans
to the right.48 He is almost wistful about corporate and other large funding
of elections, seeing that money as more moderating than small donor
money.49
It is not clear whether Klein was being deliberately provocative in his
writings—and he is clearly right that many overrate the importance of
money in determining election outcomes—but after being pushed on some
of his more controversial points, he backed off.50 In response to criticism

45
See Ezra Klein, We Got Way Too Excited About Money in the 2012 Elections, WASH.
POST (May 6, 2013, 11:00 AM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/2013/
05/06/we-got-way-too-excited-over-money-in-the-2012-elections; see also Ezra Klein, Big
Money Corrupts Washington. Small Donors Polarize It, WASH. POST (May 10, 2013, 11:53
AM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/2013/05/10/big-money-corruptswashington-small-donors-polarize-it [hereinafter Klein, Big Money].
46
Jonathan Bernstein, How to Stop the Next IRS Scandal, AM. PROSPECT (May 17, 2013),
http://prospect.org/article/how-prevent-another-irs-scandal.
47
See Klein, Big Money, supra note 45.
48
Id. (“Big money often wants the two parties more or less to get along; no one gets a tax
break if legislation dies on the floor. Small money will turn on you if you dare cut a deal with
the other side. Big money erodes what little trust Americans still have in their political system.
Small money attacks the bipartisanship that, for better and worse, is required for the system to
function.”).
49
See id.
50
See Ezra Klein, Did I Get the Money-and-Politics Debate All Wrong?, WASH. POST,
(May 28, 2013, 11:18 AM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/2013/05/28/
did-i-get-the-money-and-politics-debate-all-wrong.
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from Mark Schmitt,51 Klein conceded that obtaining enough money is necessary to be taken seriously as a candidate (the so-called “money primary”).52
In response to criticism from Lee Drutman,53 he conceded that large corporate money, especially that now flowing into Super PACs and (c)(4)s, also
tends to be polarizing, and he agreed with Drutman that providing small
donor matches for in-district contributions might make sense and not be polarizing.54 In response to Jonathan Backer,55 Klein conceded that the problem with money in politics is not necessarily how it affects electoral
outcomes but how it affects legislative outcomes (although he thought
Backer offered a poor example to prove his point).56 In the end, Klein’s
criticism was modest and he expressed his willingness to sign on to a campaign reform program. Klein concluded: “I’d take anything from the mild
disclosure laws that Republicans filibustered in 2012 to much more aggressive public financing bills, or small-donor matching bills.”57 Klein adds
much-needed skepticism to the issue of campaign finance reform, but seems
unsure of his ultimate position.
Jonathan Bernstein goes further than Klein. His solution to the problem
of money in politics is further deregulation: “Lift the limitations on contributions. If someone wants to give a million dollars or three to a House
candidate or $20M to the Republican National Committee, let ‘em. No ceilings at all.”58 Bernstein favors better disclosure and partial public financing
to provide a floor for competitors to run in House elections, but no limits:
Floors-not-ceilings with strong disclosure is a campaign-finance
approach that can work. It’s much easier to regulate than today’s
complex landscape, thus making future regulatory scandals less
likely; it promotes accountability; and it helps ensure minimally
competitive House races without hurting competitiveness of other
federal elections. If big money is inherently corrupt—and I don’t
believe it is—then at least this plan makes that corruption visible.
And it has the chance to be stable, which is good for healthy parties, and healthy parties are good for the political system.59

51
Mark Schmitt, Now We Are Way Too Excited About Campaign Finance Skepticism,
NEXT NEW DEAL (May 13, 2013), http://www.nextnewdeal.net/now-we-are-way-too-excitedabout-campaign-finance-skepticism.
52
Klein, supra note 50.
53
Lee Drutman, What Ezra Klein Gets Wrong About Big vs. Small Money in Politics,
SUNLIGHT FOUND. (May 10, 2013, 1:41 PM), http://sunlightfoundation.com/blog/2013/05/10/
big-vs-small-money-in-politics.
54
Klein, supra note 50.
55
Jonathan Backer, Why Big Money Still Won in 2012, HUFFINGTON POST (May 8, 2013,
10:51 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/jonathan-backer/why-big-money-still-won-i_b_
3237762.html.
56
Klein, supra note 50 (calling Backer’s sequestration example “ill chosen”).
57
Id.
58
Bernstein, supra note 46.
59
Id.
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Bernstein’s proposal would be a disaster for the progressive vision of
campaign finance reform. The main problem of campaign money on the
federal level—aside from the huge time commitment for Members of Congress, who spend so much time dialing for dollars that there is little time for
legislative business—is that it skews legislative priorities.60 The main argument is that large donors, lobbyists, and others who bundle contributions are
able to obtain much broader access than others to legislators and staffers to
make the case for legislative action (or inaction). Access does not guarantee
legislative success, but it is usually a prerequisite. On issues about which
there is little public salience, support on an issue by large donors or lobbyist
bundlers can be outcome determinative. The political science literature on
access and rent-seeking, especially through hired gun lobbyists, is pretty
convincing, whether Bernstein would call this phenomenon “corruption” or
not.
Deregulation of campaign financing has only exacerbated the problem
of money buying access and influencing outcomes. Now Members of Congress feel compelled either to do the bidding of those who would donate
millions of dollars to Super PACs and 501(c)(4)s acting against them or to
curry favor with supporters to do more fundraising (or encourage supportive
outside groups to do so) to fend off the outside attack. Contrary to Bernstein’s view, there is still an anti-corruption, anti-skew virtue of keeping politicians and money supporting them separate. To put it another way, $20
million in a Super PAC supporting Member of Congress X is less bad (but
still bad) than $20 million in Member X’s campaign account.61
If Members of Congress already feel beholden to large donors, bundlers, and outside money players, how much greater would the pressure be
to respond to the interests of the $1 million or $20 million donors? A
skewed politics would become much more skewed.
V. ONE GOOD IDEA: BUILDING IDEAS AND PRESERVING WHAT REMAINS
WHILE BIDING TIME
Progressives face few good choices when it comes to campaign finance
law in this environment, and if my analysis in the first three Parts of this
Essay is correct, the few paths progressives have been pursuing or suggesting are counterproductive. So what options are left? Here I propose
three: fighting to keep current state and federal campaign finance laws in
place, implementing creative state-based solutions, and laying the groundwork for overturning Citizens United.

60
See Richard L. Hasen, Lobbying, Rent-Seeking and the Constitution, 64 STAN. L. REV.
191 (2012).
61
Norman Ornstein, Citizens United: Corrupting Campaign Clarity, ROLL CALL (June 15,
2011, 12:00 AM), http://www.rollcall.com/issues/56_139/citizens_united_corrupting_campaign_clarity-206476-1.html.
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To begin with, it is important to defend what remains of campaign finance law, and to continue pursuing and defending legislation within the
confines of Supreme Court precedent. Consider, for example, how defenders of campaign finance law beat back attempts in a number of jurisdictions
to strike down laws banning direct corporate contributions to candidates.62
The Supreme Court recently declined to hear one of these challenges,63 and
to this point direct corporate bans remain valid. Work preserving what remains of campaign finance law, such as that undertaken by the Campaign
Legal Center, remains vital. Laws imposing contribution limitations on candidate elections, closing loopholes to those limitations, and improving disclosure regimes are all constitutional and must continue to be pursued and
defended. Voluntary public financing plans are still constitutional, although
thanks to the Supreme Court’s decision in a recent Arizona case barring triggers that would give additional public financing to candidates facing wealthy
opponents or large outside spending campaigns,64 it is very difficult to design systems that are both constitutional and attractive enough to candidates
that they will participate. Creative campaign finance solutions, especially
those using market-based campaign finance vouchers, remain constitutional
and should be a key part of the agenda.65 Under voucher systems, voters get
a chance to dole out public financing to candidates, parties, and—in at least
some proposals—interest groups to fund campaigns. Progressives need to
think creatively about institutional design which furthers all the goals of progressive campaign financing, from protecting robust free speech to deterring
corruption and promoting equality.
With federal action to fix campaign financing apparently off the table
for at least the near term, action turns to the states. States are no doubt
hamstrung by the Supreme Court’s money-in-politics decisions, especially
recent decisions barring corporate and labor union spending limits66 and removing a key tool for making public financing systems attractive to candidates.67 But states and localities can still take important steps, such as the
expansion of small donor matching programs68 or voucher plans, imposition
of campaign finance limits on candidates and parties, and greatly improved

62
See Thalheimer v. City of San Diego, 645 F.3d 1109 (9th Cir. 2011) (challenging the
City of San Diego’s campaign finance limits).
63
United States v. Danielczyk, 683 F.3d 611 (4th Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 1459
(2013).
64
See Arizona Free Enter. Club’s Freedom PAC v. Bennett, 131 S. Ct. 2806 (2011).
65
On campaign finance vouchers, see generally BRUCE ACKERMAN & IAN AYRES, VOTING
WITH DOLLARS: A NEW PARADIGM FOR CAMPAIGN FINANCE (2004); LAWRENCE LESSIG, REPUBLIC, LOST (2011); Richard L. Hasen, Clipping Coupons for Democracy: An Egalitarian/
Public Choice Defense of Campaign Finance Vouchers, 84 CALIF. L. REV. 1 (1996).
66
Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
67
Arizona Free Enter. Club’s Freedom PAC v. Bennett, 131 S. Ct. 2806 (2011).
68
See Michael J. Malbin et al., Small Donors, Big Democracy: New York City’s Matching
Funds as a Model for the Nation and States, 11 ELECTION L.J. 3 (2012).
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disclosure.69 No doubt many of these measures will provoke lawsuits, and
these laws need to be carefully crafted and a strong legislative record built to
allow the laws to sustain constitutional challenge.
But more work needs to be done in the jurisprudence arena. The key is
to lay the groundwork for the Supreme Court to reverse Citizens United and
other cases, returning to its role of carefully balancing rights and interests in
this very difficult arena. There will come a time in the not-too-distant future
when Justice Scalia or Justice Kennedy will leave the Court, and if a Democratic President appoints their successors, the Court’s campaign finance jurisprudence easily could turn back 180 degrees to its pre-Alito days.70
Reformers must demonstrate to the new Court that reasonable limits on
corporate, and potentially even individual, spending would not squelch political competition or inhibit robust political debate. Even progressive Justices
will need some convincing,71 and they should demand it in any case: true
progressive campaign finance reform does not favor squelching debate, especially of those with whom progressives disagree. Further, reformers must
show how to continue exemptions for the corporate press in an era in which
the definition of the press is in tremendous flux. Allowing the corporate
press exemption makes the law less coherent (though no more incoherent
than current law which tolerates limits on foreign spending on elections but
not corporate spending). But the corporate press exemption plays a key role
in protecting democratic institutions and free debate.72
In addition, scholars must do more work defining and defending governmental interests that justify reasonable (but only reasonable) campaign
finance regulations. One possibility is to seek to expand or redefine the
meaning of “corruption” the Supreme Court uses in its campaign finance
balancing. The Court’s understanding of the term corruption has vacillated
over time, and with it so has the constitutionality of campaign finance laws.
Recently, the Supreme Court in Citizens United contracted the meaning of
corruption down to something akin to bribery.

69
On the use of states to further campaign finance goals, see Anthony Johnstone, Foreword: The State of the Republican Form of Government in Montana, 73 MONT. L. REV. 5,
13–21 (2013); William Marshall, The Constitutionality of Campaign Regulation: Should Differences in a State’s Political History and Culture Matter?, 73 MONT. L. REV. 79 (2013).
70
See Richard L. Hasen, After Scalia: Don’t Give Up on Campaign Finance Reform,
However Hopeless It Seems Now, SLATE (Feb. 21, 2013, 11:49 AM), http://www.slate.com/
articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2013/02/campaign_finance_reform_when_scalia_
leaves_the_supreme_court.html.
71
See Richard L. Hasen, The Big Ban Theory? Does Elena Kagan Want to Ban Books?
No, and She Might Even Be a Free Speech Zealot, SLATE (May 24, 2010, 12:16 PM), http://
www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2010/05/the_big_ban_theory.html.
72
On this point, I have changed some of my earlier views on press exceptionalism. Cf.
Richard L. Hasen, Campaign Finance Laws and the Rupert Murdoch Problem, 77 TEX. L.
REV. 1627 (1993). In part my views changed upon seeing the incoherence of the Citizens
United regime in relation to foreign spending limits. See Hasen, Illusion of Coherence, supra
note 11.
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The Court could simply return to the broader pre-Citizens United understanding of corruption. Another possibility is that it could accept Professor
Lawrence Lessig’s arguments for a “dependence corruption” rationale to
justify new regulations.73 Professor Lessig and I have been debating whether
his “dependence corruption” argument really is something new, or whether
it represents a variation upon a political equality argument for campaign
finance regulation.74 Even though I am unconvinced that Professor Lessig’s
argument is something distinct from political equality, a new Supreme Court
majority might be convinced, or at least accept his argument as a doctrinal
hook to reach a result consistent with political equality principles without
overturning earlier precedent rejecting political equality as a permissible rationale for regulation.75
Alternatively, progressives need to develop a full and complete vision
of what it would mean for the Supreme Court to accept a political equality
interest which could justify reasonable (but not unreasonable) campaign finance regulation, consistent with progressive values. Justice Breyer
sketched a view of what this might look like in his concurring opinion in a
2001 case76 and in a book that discusses participatory self-government.77 I
also explored the issue in some depth in a book chapter.78 Judge Guido
Calabresi, in an important concurring opinion in a recent Second Circuit
case, defended political equality ideals in unusually direct terms and urged
reconsideration of the jurisprudence:
I agree completely with the Supreme Court that the First Amendment protects each person’s right to express political beliefs
through money. Where I disagree with the Court is in its repeated
insistence that any recognition of the “level playing field” interest
(elsewhere referred to as the “antidistortion interest,” Citizens
United) is inconsistent with this right. To the contrary, the antidistortion interest promotes this right in two important ways. First, it
prevents some speakers from drowning out the speech of others.

73

See LESSIG, supra note 65, at 15–20, 230–46.
See Richard L. Hasen, Fixing Washington, 126 HARV. L. REV. 552 (2012) (reviewing
LAWRENCE LESSIG, REPUBLIC, LOST (2011) and JACK ABRAMOFF, CAPITOL PUNISHMENT
(2011)); Lawrence Lessig, A Reply to Professor Hasen, 126 HARV. L. REV. F. 61 (2012);
Richard L. Hasen, Is “Dependence Corruption” Distinct From a Political Equality Rationale
for Campaign Finance Regulation? A Reply to Professor Lessig, 12 ELECTION L.J. 305 (2013);
Lawrence Lessig, What an Originalist Would Understand “Corruption” to Mean, 102 CALIF.
L. REV. 1, (2014).
75
See Bruce E. Cain, Is Dependence Corruption the Solution to America’s Campaign
Finance Problems?, 102 CALIF. L. REV. 37 (2014); Guy Charles, Corruption Temptation, 102
CALIF. L. REV. 25, (2014). Lessig responds to Cain and Charles in Lawrence Lessig, A Reply
to Professors Cain and Charles, 102 CALIF. L. REV. 49 (2014).
76
See Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov. PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 401–03 (2000) (Breyer, J.,
concurring).
77
See generally STEPHEN J. BREYER, ACTIVE LIBERTY: INTERPRETING OUR DEMOCRATIC
CONSTITUTION (2005).
78
HASEN, supra note 17, at 101–38.
74
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And second, it safeguards something of fundamental First Amendment importance—the ability to have one’s protected expression
indicate the intensity of one’s political beliefs. These values,
moreover, have not gone unrecognized in underlying First Amendment jurisprudence.79
The idea common in all of this writing is to continue to provide strict
scrutiny to police campaign finance laws for pro-incumbent and anti-speech
bias, but to accept political equality as a compelling interest for reform that
can justify egalitarian and speech-enhancing programs. It is a tough and
delicate balance. Much more work needs to be done on this question.
Opponents of campaign finance laws have looked at this issue with a
long time horizon. Justice Scalia and Justice Kennedy first dissented in the
1990 Austin case upholding limits on corporate spending in elections.80 They
had to wait two decades for a reversal, and they never stopped dissenting in
cases inconsistent with their vision of a free market in campaign finance.
Noted campaign finance lawyer Jim Bopp had a ten-year plan for attacks on
campaign laws.81 With a sympathetic Supreme Court so far he has gotten
some, but not all, of what he has wished for.
Progressive campaign finance reform supporters need to be just as patient as their conservative opponents, and ready to move forward when the
moment is right.

79
Ognibene v. Parkes, 671 F.3d 174, 197–98 (2d Cir. 2011) (Calabresi, J., concurring)
(citation omitted).
80
See Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652 (1990) (Scalia, J., & Kennedy, J., dissenting).
81
David D. Kirkpatrick, A Quest to End Spending Rules for Campaigns, N.Y. TIMES (Jan.
24, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/25/us/politics/25bopp.html (“‘We had a 10-year
plan to take all this down,’ [Bopp] said in an interview. ‘And if we do it right, I think we can
pretty well dismantle the entire regulatory regime that is called campaign finance law.’”).
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